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How Different Are Originalism and 
Non-Originalism? 
Peter J. Smith* 
Several prominent and self-described “new originalists” have begun to contend that the 
objective original meaning of many of the Constitution’s provisions should be ascertained 
at a very high level of generality. They have also urged recognition of a distinction 
between constitutional “interpretation,” which involves the determination of the meaning 
of the constitutional text, and constitutional “construction,” which involves the 
formulation of legal rules to apply the text to concrete situations. These scholars have 
noted that because the constitutional text often is phrased at a very high level of generality, 
originalist interpretation alone simply cannot answer many difficult questions of 
constitutional law, and thus courts must formulate rules that are not themselves dictated 
by the original meaning. 
If this is what originalism entails, then there is no obvious distinction, at least in practice 
and possibly in theory, between new originalism and non-originalism. After all, most 
non-originalists treat the original meaning as the starting point for any interpretive 
inquiry, but are willing to look elsewhere—to history, precedent, structure, and policy, 
among others—to construct constitutional meaning when the text is vague or 
indeterminate. 
All of this naturally leads one to question how different originalism and non-originalism 
really are. The short answer is that it depends on whom we ask, because not every 
originalist—indeed, not even every “new originalist”—accepts these recent modifications 
to originalist thinking. Given modern originalism’s origins as a response to the perceived 
excesses of non-originalism, it is not surprising that many originalists have resisted 
refinements to the theory that would tend to collapse the distinction between originalism 
and non-originalism. But the growing rift among originalists poses a greater risk to 
originalism than the mere prospect of intramural disagreement. Much of the force of the 
case for originalism has long derived from its claims to neutrality and objectivity. As the 
originalist tent grew, embracing scholars with a broad range of substantive commitments, 
these claims became perhaps more plausible. But originalists’ rejection of the claims of 
the “new new originalists”—claims that follow quite naturally, even if not inevitably, from 
the important refinements of new originalism itself—and their continuing insistence on an 
approach to constitutional interpretation that usually produces substantively conservative 
results have threatened once again to undermine their claims to neutrality and objectivity. 
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Introduction 
Modern originalism arose as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
expansive interpretations of the Constitution’s rights-granting provisions.1 
Critics of the Court began to urge fidelity to original intent as a way to 
constrain the Justices’ ability to read their policy preferences into the 
Constitution.2 Although early originalists such as Robert Bork and Raoul 
Berger sought to offer an affirmative justification for this approach, early 
originalism’s most appealing feature, at least to its proponents, was 
simply that it was not non-originalism, the approach that had produced a 
right to privacy3 and a broad range of rights for persons accused of 
crimes.4 
Originalism has evolved a great deal since Bork’s and Berger’s 
initial defenses. The “old originalism,” which tended to focus on the 
intent of the Framers and was largely a negative theory developed to 
criticize the decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, has been mostly 
displaced by the “new originalism,” which tends to focus on the objective 
meaning of the constitutional text and seeks to provide a positive basis 
for constitutional decisionmaking.5 To be sure, this evolution was not 
linear, and at any given moment in the last forty years, there have been 
multiple, and often competing, versions of originalism.6 But if nothing 
else, originalism has consistently evolved as originalists have refined their 
approach to respond to criticism and to achieve greater theoretical 
coherence. 
 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965). 
 4. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966). 
 5. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 
2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 599, 599–610 (2004); infra notes 38–50 and accompanying text. 
 6. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239, 241, 242 (2009). 
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The academic debate about originalism remains vibrant and 
dynamic, and the theoretical case for originalism is more nuanced now 
than ever before. So nuanced, in fact, that—at least as described by 
several prominent originalists—originalism is no longer very different, 
either in theory or in application, from non-originalism. 
Consider two recent and notable developments in the academic 
debate over originalism. First, several prominent and self-described new 
originalists have begun to contend that the objective original meaning of 
many of the Constitution’s provisions—including the broad rights-
granting provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment—should be 
ascertained at a very high level of generality.7 Second, some new 
originalists have urged recognition of a distinction between constitutional 
interpretation, which involves the determination of the meaning of the 
constitutional text, and constitutional construction, which involves the 
formulation of legal rules to apply the text—particularly when it is vague 
or open ended—to concrete situations.8 Originalism, they have noted, is 
merely a theory of interpretation, and because the constitutional text 
often is phrased at a very high level of generality, originalist 
interpretation alone simply cannot answer many difficult questions of 
constitutional law.9 These originalists, accordingly, have argued that 
courts must formulate rules that are not themselves dictated by the 
original meaning, a process that necessarily “requires an act of creativity 
beyond interpretation.”10 These originalists have readily acknowledged 
that the consequence of this focus on broader levels of generality and the 
frequent need for construction is that, in practice, judges have substantial 
discretion to identify rights in light of the Constitution’s broad 
principles.11 Because these theorists have, in pressing these arguments 
about originalism, taken the claims of other new originalists to a logical 
but novel conclusion, I call these theorists the “new new originalists.” 
If, as the new new originalists contend, an originalist judge’s 
obligation is to seek the original meaning of abstractly expressed text at a 
high level of generality—essentially divining the general principle that 
animates the text—and to formulate doctrine that seeks to apply that 
principle to modern circumstances—a process that inevitably permits a 
range of possible outcomes—then there is no obvious distinction, at least 
in practice and possibly in theory, between new new originalism and non-
originalism. After all, most non-originalists treat the original meaning as 
 
 7. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 54–64 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 54–64 and accompanying text. 
 10. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, 
and Judicial Review 7 (1999). 
 11. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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the starting point for any interpretive inquiry, but are willing to look 
elsewhere—to history, precedent, structure, and policy, among others—
to construct constitutional meaning when the text is vague or 
indeterminate.12 
All of this naturally leads one to question how different originalism 
and non-originalism really are. The short answer is that it depends on 
who we ask, because not every originalist—indeed, not even every “new 
originalist”—accepts these recent modifications to originalist thinking. 
Some originalists (including many self-described new originalists) agree 
in theory that judges should sometimes seek the original meaning at a 
high level of generality, but nevertheless conclude that, in fact, the 
Constitution generally contains limited and determinate provisions that 
accordingly do not confer broad discretion on judges.13 Other originalists 
reject these moves altogether, concluding that judges should seek the 
original meaning at a high level of specificity, and that unconstrained 
construction is inconsistent with any proper theory of originalist 
decisionmaking.14 To both these groups of originalists, originalism and 
non-originalism remain quite different, both in theory and in practice. 
Given modern originalism’s origins as a response to the perceived 
excesses of non-originalism, it is not surprising that many originalists 
have resisted refinements to the theory that would tend to collapse the 
distinction between originalism and non-originalism. But the growing rift 
among originalists poses a greater risk to originalism than the mere 
prospect of intramural disagreement. Much of the force of the case for 
originalism has long derived from its claims to neutrality and 
objectivity.15 As the originalist tent grew, embracing scholars with a 
broad range of substantive commitments, these claims became perhaps 
more plausible. But originalists’ rejection of the new new originalists’ 
claims—claims that follow quite naturally, even if not inevitably, from 
the most important refinements of new originalism itself—and their 
continuing insistence on an approach to constitutional interpretation that 
usually produces substantively conservative results have threatened, once 
again, to undermine their claims to neutrality and objectivity. 
As originalism has evolved, in other words, it has increasingly 
presented its long-time proponents with a choice between equally 
unappealing options: They can acknowledge that originalism is a limited 
theory of interpretation that alone cannot answer many questions of 
constitutional law and thus, accept judicial creativity in implementing the 
 
 12. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 104–11 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 112–30 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 773, 779–95; 
infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
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Constitution’s abstract principles; or they can instead continue to claim 
that originalism can effectively answer most constitutional questions 
without any need for broad judicial discretion. If they choose the former, 
they essentially accept that originalism is not meaningfully different from 
non-originalism. If they choose the latter, they risk revealing originalism 
as a political philosophy, rather than an interpretive methodology. 
Originalists’ choice will in large part determine the continuing viability of 
the methodology. 
I.  The Old Originalism, the New Originalism, and the New New 
Originalism 
Although originalism,16 in one form or another, has deep historical 
roots in the Anglo-American legal tradition,17 the modern American 
originalist movement arose in the early 1970s as a response to the 
controversial decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts. Early 
originalists were dismayed by the Court’s capacious view of the 
Constitution, which had enabled it to find a right to privacy;18 
categorically to prohibit (even if only for a short time) the imposition of 
the death penalty;19 and to impose on law enforcement officials a range of 
new constraints.20 In these critics’ view, the Warren Court, unconstrained 
by the Constitution’s text or original intent, had effectively been making, 
rather than interpreting, the law, an act inconsistent with the judicial role 
in a democracy.21 
The early originalists urged fidelity to the Framers’ original intent as 
an antidote to these perceived excesses.22 To these theorists, the Court’s 
approach—then often called living constitutionalism23 and today, in a sign 
of the originalists’ inroads in the academic debate over constitutional 
 
 16. As will become apparent, the label “originalism” embraces a wide range of interpretive 
theories, see Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 241–42, but I use the term here to refer to the family of 
modern approaches that regard “the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial 
adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.” Whittington, 
supra note 5, at 599. 
 17. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change—Legal Fundamentality 
Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 44 (1993). 
 18. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 
(1965). 
 19. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). 
 20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966). 
 21. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 283–311, 351–72 (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 6–10 (1971).  
 22. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 21, at 8; Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and 
Economic Rights, 23 San Diego L. Rev. 823, 823 (1986). 
 23. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 693 
(1976). 
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interpretation, often called non-originalism24—was an unprincipled form 
of judicial lawmaking. Bork, for example, argued that unlike the 
approach of original intent, which tethers judges to constitutional text 
and history, any other approach inevitably invites judges to impose their 
own values and preferences on the rest of us and thus to engage in 
politics under the guise of interpretation.25 
This early originalism, which Keith Whittington has called the “old 
originalism,”26 was largely a negative and reactive theory, concerned 
principally with offering a critique of existing practice.27 To be sure, the 
early originalists labored to advance an affirmative justification for their 
approach as well. Bork and Berger, for example, argued that originalism 
was the only neutral and objective approach to interpretation and thus, 
the only approach that was consistent with the judicial role in a 
democratic society.28 But to its early adherents, originalism was appealing 
principally as a form of criticism, and primarily in contrast to what it was 
not.29 
Originalism has evolved a great deal since the early 1970s. As Tom 
Colby and others have recently explained,30 whereas the early proponents 
of originalism focused on the original intent of the Framers,31 many 
originalists eventually concluded that the proper object of inquiry was 
 
 24. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 852–56 (1989). 
 25. See Bork, supra note 21, at 6–10; Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. Tex. 
L.J. 383, 394–95 (1985). 
 26. Whittington, supra note 5, at 599. 
 27. Id. at 601; see also Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional 
Originalism, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 31–35) (on file with the 
Hastings Law Journal). 
 28. See Berger, supra note 21, at 296 (“Substitution by the Court of its own value choices for 
those embodied in the Constitution violates the basic principle of government by consent of the 
governed.”); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 143 
(1990) (“[O]nly the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of 
constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.”). 
 29. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not an Originalist” 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 259, 269, 274 
(2010) (praising originalism as “an elegant response to a genuine problem,” but rejecting it because it 
would “open an all but unbridgeable chasm between constitutional decision making” and all other 
aspects of legal practice). 
 30. The evolution of originalist thought has become a familiar story. For more detailed accounts, 
see Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 247–62; Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 
99 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3–26) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal); Kesavan 
& Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1134–48; Whittington, supra note 5, at 599–610. 
 31. Berger, supra note 21, at 3; Bork, supra note 22, at 823; Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on 
an Old Problem—The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. Rev. 811, 
811–12 (1983); Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 694–97; Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Address 
Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in U.S. Dep’t. of 
Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook app. b at 97 
(1987) [hereinafter Sourcebook]. 
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the original meaning.32 This change was necessary to respond to at least 
two serious problems with the focus on original intent: the difficulty of 
ascertaining collective intent33 and the fact that the Framers apparently 
did not intend for subsequent generations to interpret the Constitution 
according to their original intent.34 A focus on original meaning, by 
contrast, did not obviously suffer from these problems, because it could 
be framed as an inquiry to determine objective textual meaning,35 
measured by the hypothetical understanding of a reasonable person at 
the time of the framing,36 and was largely consistent with the prevailing 
interpretive norms at the time of the framing.37 
As Whittington has explained, the transition from original intent to 
objective original meaning roughly marked the move from the old 
originalism to the new originalism.38 Whereas the old originalists were 
mostly concerned with criticizing alternative approaches to constitutional 
interpretation and with restraining judges, the new originalists offered an 
affirmative case for originalist interpretation and were principally 
concerned with constitutional fidelity, rather than judicial restraint 
simpliciter.39 To be sure, there are still prominent originalists who closely 
identify with the old originalism,40 and there are important disagreements 
among self-professed new originalists about both the appropriate 
 
 32. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 30, at 8–13; Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1139–40; Antonin 
Scalia, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on 
Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), in Sourcebook, supra note 31, app. c at 106 (“I ought to campaign 
to change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.”). Many 
originalists embraced a focus on the original understanding—sometimes subjective, sometimes 
objective—during the journey from original intent to original meaning. See Colby & Smith, supra note 
6, at 250–52; Colby, supra note 30, at 12–13. 
 33. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 
204, 209–22 (1980). 
 34. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 
948 (1985). 
 35. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1132, 1147; Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts 
in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and 
Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3, 17, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 36. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1132; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did 
the Constitution Become Law?, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 25 (2001). 
 37. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 
1090 (1989) (noting that Powell’s evidence demonstrated that the common law method of interpreting 
text focused on the language’s objective meaning in the document, not its author’s subjective intent). 
 38. Whittington, supra note 5, at 602–10. 
 39. Id. at 609. 
 40. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 
103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 703, 704 (2009); Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism 1 (Univ. of San 
Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-067, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1235722; Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism 
16–28 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-028, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150447. 
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justification for the approach41 and the approach’s capacity to constrain 
judges,42 among other things. Originalism today, in other words, is far 
from a monolithic movement. But new originalism clearly has had 
significantly more staying power in debates over constitutional 
interpretation than did the old originalism, and in recent years, new 
originalism has succeeded in winning new adherents, even among 
academics who previously did not identify as originalists at all.43 
New originalism has been successful for at least two reasons. First, 
many new originalists have contended that the question of the 
Constitution’s meaning is distinct from the question whether we ought to 
follow the Constitution in the first place.44 This conclusion helps to 
soften, even if not entirely dispose of, a central challenge to originalism: 
that it suffers from an insurmountable dead-hand problem.45 Non-
originalism has long been animated by the concern that the Constitution, 
which can be amended only through a difficult super-majoritarian 
procedure, risks losing legitimacy today if it cannot be read to embody 
modern, rather than anachronistic, values.46 Many new originalists 
 
 41. Compare Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 Va. L. 
Rev. 1437, 1440 (2007) (“[T]he most common and most influential justification for originalism[] [is] 
popular sovereignty and the judicially enforced will of the people.”), with Lawrence B. Solum, 
Semantic Originalism 26 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 
(grounding originalism in the philosophy of language).  
 42. Compare Scalia, supra note 24, at 863–64 (arguing that originalism constrains judges, because 
it “establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually” distinct from the judge’s own preferences), 
with John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 473, 473–76 (2008) (“Can originalism, or any methodology, keep interpreters from 
interpreting the Constitution along the lines that they think good? . . . [I]t cannot . . . .”). 
 43. See Colby, supra note 30, at 34; infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 44. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1127–28 (defending objective original meaning 
as the object of interpretation but acknowledging that it is legitimate “not to treat ‘this Constitution’ as 
authoritative”); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1823, 1835 
(1997) (“[I]nterpreting the Constitution and applying the Constitution are two different enterprises.”); 
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const. Comment. 47, 53 (2006) 
(describing the question whether we should “follow the instructions in the Constitution” as a 
“question of political morality, not of interpretive theory”); Solum, supra note 41, at 30 (“What words 
mean is one thing; what we should do about their meaning is another.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958) (“The question [is] 
whether one generation of men has a right to bind another . . . .”); see also Ethan J. Leib, The 
Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 Const. Comment. 353, 358–60 (2007) (“[N]on-
originalists are plagued by anxiety about the dead hand of the past—and think we need to update and 
affirm the document’s underlying principles if it is to be binding on anyone living today.”); Richard A. 
Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 165, 192 (2008) (“[G]overning the 
population of the United States today according to the constitutional understandings of people long 
since dead should not be understood as showing respect for democratic-enactment authority.”).  
 46. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433, 438 (1985) (“What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the 
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address this concern, at least in part by, maintaining that originalism is 
merely an interpretive theory designed to determine what the 
Constitution means, not to provide a theory of adjudication.47 Gary 
Lawson, for example, has argued that the premise that the Constitution’s 
meaning is determined by the objective original meaning of its text does 
not entail the conclusion that this meaning must control the outcome of 
any particular legal controversy.48 Of course, simply asserting that these 
questions are conceptually distinct cannot entirely answer non-
originalists’ dead-hand-based objections, either in theory or as a matter 
of practice.49 But by professing to remain agnostic on the question 
whether the Constitution ought to be binding, many new originalists 
have ostensibly moderated some of the more aggressive claims of the old 
originalists, who had insisted that it is categorically illegitimate for judges 
to decide cases based on anything other than original intent.50 
Second, and more important, new originalism has been successful 
because once one accepts its basic claim that the proper object of 
interpretation is the objective original meaning of the constitutional text, 
other claims with substantially broader appeal logically—even if not 
 
wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our time. . . . Our Constitution was not 
intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one . . . .”); Leib, supra note 45, at 358–
60. 
 47. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1127–28; Lawson, supra note 44, at 1824; 
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 44, at 53; Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution 
(and How Not to), 115 Yale L.J. 2037, 2062 (2006). 
 48. Lawson, supra note 44, at 1824 (“[A] theory of interpretation allows us to determine what the 
Constitution truly means, while a theory of adjudication allows us to determine what role, if any, the 
Constitution’s meaning should play in particular decisions.”); id. at 1825 (“One can be a strict 
interpretative originalist and forcefully deny that the Constitution has any political legitimacy.”). 
Lawrence Solum has made a similar argument in distinguishing between “semantic originalism” and 
“normative originalism.” Solum, supra note 41, at 27–33. 
 49. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 32 (2009) (“[B]ecause it is not 
in fact controversial in the contemporary debates over American constitutional interpretation that 
judges should enforce the law, the non-normative variant of Originalism is not interestingly 
distinct . . . from its more common, avowedly normative, cousin.”); Colby, supra note 30, at 30 (“[The] 
response [to the dead-hand problem] is something of a cop out. Our legal system and legal culture 
presuppose that judges must follow the law, so if the meaning of the Constitution is its original public 
meaning, then it goes without saying that judges will have to follow it.”); Leib, supra note 45, at 359 
(“[O]riginal meaning originalism . . . gives pride of place to the very dead hand living constitutionalists 
are convinced we must resist to maintain the document’s present-day legitimacy.”). Jack Balkin, who, 
as I explain infra, is a new new originalist, has nevertheless argued that, properly conceived, 
originalism addresses the dead-hand problem just as nimbly as does living constitutionalism. See Jack 
M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291, 303 (2007) (“The Constitution is 
a great work that spans many lifetimes, a vibrant multi-generational undertaking, in which succeeding 
generations pledge faith in the constitutional project and exercise fidelity to the Constitution by 
making the Constitution their own.”); see also infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text. 
 50. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 21, at 364 (“A judicial power to revise the Constitution 
transforms the bulwark of our liberties into a parchment barrier.”); Bork, supra note 21, at 6 (“[A] 
legitimate Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the Justices.”). 
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inevitably—follow. And, indeed, several prominent and self-described 
new originalists have pressed such claims about the nature of the search 
for objective original meaning. I am interested here in two particular 
refinements to new originalist theory that have been urged by some new 
originalists, who I refer to as “new new originalists.”51 
First, new originalism’s focus on the objective meaning of the 
constitutional text rather than on the Framers’ intentions or 
understandings has led some self-described originalists to conclude that 
at least some provisions of the Constitution are properly interpreted at a 
very high level of generality. Whereas many old originalists resisted the 
conclusion that the Constitution’s open-ended, ostensibly rights-granting 
provisions conferred broad discretion on judges to declare and protect 
rights that are not specifically enumerated,52 some new originalists have 
begun to argue that fidelity to the original meaning requires the 
conclusion that some of those provisions do just that. Randy Barnett and 
Jack Balkin, for example, have contended that the Constitution’s more 
abstractly phrased provisions should be interpreted in light of the high 
level of generality at which they were written, leading them both to 
conclude that judges have substantial discretion to identify rights in light 
of the Constitution’s broad principles.53 
Second, the new new originalists have recently recognized a 
distinction between constitutional interpretation, which involves the 
determination of the meaning of the constitutional text, and 
constitutional construction, which involves the formulation of legal rules 
 
 51. Because the new new originalists believe that the Constitution’s vague provisions require 
judicial construction in the formulation of legal rules, see infra notes 55–66 and accompanying text, 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport refer to their approach as “constructionist originalism.” John 
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation 
and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751, 752 (2009). 
 52. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 21, at 99–116 (rejecting the “open-ended phraseology theory” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Bork also advanced such a view, see Bork, supra note 28, at 166, 
178–85 (rejecting the view that the Constitution’s open-ended provisions authorize judges to create 
rights), although, as I explain infra note 76, he appears to be of two minds on this question. 
 53. Balkin, supra note 49, at 304–05 (“[T]he fact that adopters chose text that features general 
and abstract concepts is normally the best evidence that they sought to embody general and abstract 
principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be fleshed out later on by later 
generations.”); Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 549, 553 (2009) (“[Constitutional drafters] use standards or principles because they want to 
channel politics but delegate the details to future generations.”); id. at 569–75 (describing the courts’ 
role in construction); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 
75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7, 11–13, 23 (2006) [hereinafter Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity] (“That the founders and 
the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted texts that leave some discretion in application to 
changing circumstances is not a bug. It’s a feature.”); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with 
Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 Const. Comment. 257, 264 (2005) [hereinafter 
Barnett, Trumping Precedent] (“That the Constitution includes more open-ended or abstract 
provisions, and thereby delegates discretion to judges, does not justify ignoring these portions of the 
text.”). 
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to apply the text—particularly when it is vague or open ended—to 
concrete situations. Balkin, Barnett, Lawrence Solum, and Whittington 
have all noted that because the objective meaning of the constitutional 
text often is vague or “underdetermined,”54 originalism, which is a theory 
only of interpretation, simply cannot produce answers to many questions 
of constitutional law.55 In such cases, these theorists have argued, the 
questions can be resolved only by construction, which is “outside the 
domain of originalism”56 and necessarily requires an act of creativity 
beyond interpretation.57 
Barnett, for example, has defended original-meaning originalism, 
but has argued that construction is necessary when the original meaning 
of the constitutional text does not “provide enough guidance to identify a 
single rule of law to apply to a particular case at hand.”58 Barnett 
acknowledges that there are often multiple plausible constructions that 
are consistent with the original meaning of the text, but he urges 
interpreters to choose constructions that enhance constitutional 
legitimacy.59 Balkin has similarly defended fidelity to the original 
 
 54. Whittington, supra note 10, at 7. 
 55. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 121 
(2004); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional 
Meaning 8 (1999); Whittington, supra note 10, at 5–14; Balkin, supra note 53, at 559–60; Barnett, 
Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 264–65; Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923, 974 (2009); Solum, supra note 41, at 20, 67–89. 
 56. Solum, supra note 55, at 967. Barnett has argued that “constitutional constructions, though 
not deducible immediately from the text, still may properly be connected to or constrained by it.” 
Barnett, supra note 55, at 124–25; accord Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 110 (2001) (“[T]hough by definition constructions are not in the 
Constitution, they can be of the Constitution.”). 
 57. Whittington, supra note 10, at 7. Barnett explains the relationship between interpretation 
and construction as follows: 
[O]riginalism is warranted as a theory of interpretation—that is, as a method of determining 
the meaning of the words written in the Constitution. For better or worse, knowing the 
meaning of these words only takes us so far in resolving current cases and controversies. 
Due either to ambiguity or vagueness, the original meaning of the text may not always 
determine a unique rule of law to be applied to a particular case or controversy. While not 
indeterminate, the original meaning can be “underdeterminate.” Indeed, because the 
framers frequently used abstract language, this will often be the case. When this happens, 
interpretation must be supplemented by constitutional construction—within the bounds 
established by original meaning. In this manner, construction fills the unavoidable gaps in 
constitutional meaning when interpretation has reached its limits. 
Barnett, supra note 56, at 108 (footnote omitted). To be sure, Whittington’s claim about construction 
has been quite modest; he has argued that construction is as much the province of the political 
branches as it is the province of the courts. See Whittington, supra note 10, at 7–13, 172–73. But 
Balkin, Barnett, and Solum have all made clear that they view constitutional construction as an 
appropriate task for judges as well. See Balkin, supra note 53, at 569–75; Barnett, Trumping Precedent, 
supra note 53, at 264; Solum, supra note 55, at 979–80. 
 58. Barnett, supra note 55, at 121. 
 59. Id. at 126. In Barnett’s view, constitutional legitimacy is accomplished through application of 
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meaning,60 but has noted that the original meaning “does not dictate the 
results of constitutional construction,” which “for a very large number of 
disputed cases . . . is the name of the game.”61 Balkin has offered a rich, 
multi-institutional account of construction, under which social 
movements, the political branches, and the courts engage in an ongoing 
process of constructing constitutional meaning.62 In Balkin’s account, 
“courts translate constitutional politics into constitutional law,”63 but 
unlike in Barnett’s account, there is no overarching substantive template 
to guide this process; instead, Balkin argues that the judges who engage 
in the process of construction should “use the various modalities of 
argument—text, structure, history, precedent, prudence, and national 
ethos—to decide the cases before them.”64 
The new new originalists’ claim that some provisions of the 
Constitution ought to be interpreted at a high level of generality, and 
that even originalist interpretation often requires courts to engage in 
creative65 and “political”66 acts of construction in the formulation of legal 
rules did not come out of the blue. Instead, they flow logically, even if 
not inevitably, from core elements of new originalism.67 As noted above, 
the core feature of new originalism was a focus on the objective original 
meaning of the text as the proper object of interpretation.68 Once new 
 
a “presumption of liberty” that promotes a libertarian vision of constitutional meaning. Id. at 259–69. 
 60. See Balkin, supra note 53, at 552; Balkin, supra note 49, at 295. 
 61. Balkin, supra note 53, at 604–05. 
 62. See id. at 585–601. 
 63. Id. at 598. 
 64. Id. at 609. 
 65. Whittington, supra note 55, at 5 (“Unlike jurisprudential interpretation, construction 
provides for an element of creativity in construing constitutional meaning.”). 
 66. Whittington, supra note 10, at 5; see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 51, at 785 (arguing 
that choosing among possible constructions requires reference to “political morality”). Barnett objects 
to this characterization, because “it suggests that such constructions are themselves completely 
unconstrained by the determinable original meaning of the text.” Barnett, supra note 55, at 124. But 
he agrees that there can be a range of permissible constructions, and that judges must choose among 
them. See Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 265. 
 67. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 
427, 443 (2007) (“My Article . . . attempts to move th[e] analysis along, making salient the logical 
consequences of the turn to original [public] meaning.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 620 
(1999) (“Perhaps most important of all, however, originalism has itself changed—from original 
intention to original meaning.”); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1132, 1144 (coining the term 
“original, objective-public-meaning textualism” and defending the approach on the ground that it 
corrects the “jurisprudence of ‘original understanding,’” which changed the “jurisprudence of ‘original 
intent’” before that); Lawson, supra note 44, at 1834 (“[T]he Constitution’s meaning is its original 
public meaning. Other approaches to interpretation are simply wrong.”); supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. As a corollary to their embrace of the objective original meaning as the proper 
object of interpretation, most new originalists also rejected reliance on the original expected 
applications in determining constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two 
Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 663, 668–72 (2009); Michael W. 
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originalists had decided that the particular intent, understanding, or 
expectations of the Framers were not determinative of the original 
meaning, but instead that the proper object of the interpretive inquiry 
was the original objective meaning of the text, it followed that the text’s 
objective meaning should be assessed at the level of generality at which a 
reasonable person would have read it.69 And, indeed, many new 
originalists accept this claim, at least in theory.70 
The new new originalists have simply taken this claim one step 
further. By their account, once one accepts that many of the 
Constitution’s provisions are demonstrably expressed at a very high level 
of abstraction, it follows that the Constitution often states merely broad 
principles rather than concrete and determinate rules.71 And once one 
recognizes that many constitutional provisions state only broad and 
vague principles, it is not a great leap to conclude that there are 
significant limits to originalism’s capacity to resolve concrete questions of 
constitutional law and thus, that originalism must be supplemented by 
some other theory of adjudication. 
In one respect, then, new new originalism is not meaningfully 
different from new originalism. Both recognize that a genuine 
commitment to the original objective meaning of the constitutional text 
 
McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral 
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1284 (1997); Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2059; 
Antonin Scalia, Response, in Matter of Interpretation, supra note 35, at 144. Accordingly, most new 
originalists claim not to interpret the Constitution by seeking to determine how the Framers of a 
constitutional provision would have answered a particular question of constitutional law, but instead 
by seeking the objective original meaning of the text, as measured by the “hypothetical 
understandings” of an “artificially constructed” “reasonable person” at the time of ratification. 
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 44, at 48. 
 69. See Whittington, supra note 10, at 182–87; id. at 187 (“The level of generality at which terms 
were defined is not an a priori theoretical question but a contextualized historical one.”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349, 359 (1992) (“Thus the question 
becomes the level of generality the ratifiers and other sophisticated political actors at the time would 
have imputed to the text.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 68, at 672–74 (“[Some provisions of the Constitution] 
employ standards and not rules. . . . It is not an adequate answer in these situations to say, as Justice 
Scalia sometimes does, that originalist judges ought not to enforce Clauses of this kind because they 
do not lend themselves to principled judicial application.”); McConnell, supra note 68, at 1280–81 (“A 
genuine commitment to the semantic intentions of the Framers requires the interpreter to seek the 
level of generality at which the particular language was understood by its Framers . . . It is perfectly 
possible that, upon dispassionate historical investigation, the interpreter would discover that some 
provisions of the Constitution were understood at a high level of generality . . . .”); infra notes 71–78 
and accompanying text. 
 71.  See Whittington, supra note 5, at 611 (“[I]t is entirely possible that the principles that the 
founders meant to embody in the text were fairly abstract.”); Balkin, supra note 53, at 553 (“If [the 
text of the Constitution] states a standard, we must apply the standard. And if it states a general 
principle, we must apply the principle.”); Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 263 
(“[Sometimes] the original meaning is rather abstract, or at a higher level of generality.”).  
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might, at least in theory, require the conclusion that some provisions of 
the Constitution express only abstract principles.72 Just as new new 
originalist Balkin has argued that the “proper level of generality for the 
constitutional principles in the text is the one we find in the text itself,”73 
Michael McConnell, who Whittington has described as the “most 
prominent new originalist,”74 has noted that a “genuine commitment” to 
originalism “requires the interpreter to seek the level of generality at 
which the particular language was understood by its Framers.”75 Indeed, 
even Bork, the original patron saint of old originalism, eventually came 
to the view that the faithful practice of originalism requires the 
interpreter, in seeking the “meaning of a text,” to determine “its degree 
of generality, which is part of its meaning,” and then to apply it.76 As 
Steven Smith has explained, “most originalists have long advocated, 
basically, the ‘method of text and principle’” originalism that Balkin has 
 
 72. New originalists have generally embraced the objective original meaning of the text as the 
touchstone of interpretation. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1132; Gary Lawson, 
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 398 (2002); Scalia, supra note 35, at 38. New new 
originalists have as well. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 53, at 552–55; Barnett, supra note 56, at 105; 
Solum, supra note 55, at 940–41. 
 73. Balkin, supra note 67, at 494. 
 74. Whittington, supra note 5, at 608. 
 75. McConnell, supra note 68, at 1280. 
 76. Bork, supra note 28, at 149 (arguing that the correct level of generality is the level that “the 
text and historical evidence warrant”). On this view, the Constitution provides only a “major 
premise”—that is, a “principle or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect”—against which the 
interpreter must judge the challenged action. Id. at 162–63. Bork famously followed this form of 
reasoning in attempting to defend Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), on originalist 
grounds. See Bork, supra note 28, at 82 (“[E]quality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, 
though the ratifiers did not understand that . . . . The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment 
into being was equality . . . .”). In practice, however, Bork has tended to vary the level of generality at 
which he seeks the original meaning without any explanation about why some provisions should be 
interpreted at a high level of generality and others should be interpreted at a high level of specificity. 
For example, he has criticized Griswold and Roe on the ground that contraception is not “covered 
specifically or by obvious implication by any provision of the Constitution,” id. at 258, and “the right 
to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be found in the Constitution,” id. at 112. But though he 
has never explained why, he reads the Free Speech Clause and the Equal Protection Clause at much 
higher levels of abstraction. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, 
J., concurring) (“[The Framers] gave into our keeping the value of preserving free expression and, in 
particular, the preservation of political expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at the 
core of those clauses. Perhaps the framers did not envision libel actions as a major threat to that 
freedom. . . . But if, over time, the libel action becomes a threat to the central meaning of the first 
amendment, why should not judges adapt their doctrines?”); Bork, supra note 28, at 82 (Equal 
Protection Clause); Harrison, supra note 42, at 479–80 (noting that Bork’s Ollman opinion employs a 
sort of a “purposivism,” originalism that “tak[es] as normative the original purpose” of the First 
Amendment); David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1373, 1381–
82 (1990) (reviewing Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
(1990)) (arguing that Bork’s high-level-of-generality analysis of Brown is inconsistent with the 
originalist methodology that he advocates for other questions); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative 
Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 432 n.25 (1997) (arguing the same). 
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defended,77 and that “Balkin, arguably, is simply a more prodigal 
practitioner of that method.”78 
But if new new originalism flows naturally from new originalism, it 
also sometimes flows in directions that many new originalists do not 
want—and certainly most old originalists would not have wanted—to go. 
To be sure, some of the new new originalists, such as Whittington and 
Solum, have been interested primarily in the theoretical questions that 
have arisen in the effort to identify a defensible interpretive 
methodology, rather than in concrete questions about what sorts of 
results originalism might be likely to produce in practice.79 But other new 
new originalists have been interested not only in hermeneutics but also in 
the likely results of application of the theory. For example, Barnett has 
addressed the question of level of generality and the distinction between 
interpretation and construction in the course of arguing that the 
Constitution, properly understood as an originalist matter, requires 
libertarianism at both the state and federal level.80 And Balkin has 
developed these claims in the course of arguing, among other things, that 
the result in Roe v. Wade81 is consistent with the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.82 New new originalism, in other words, claims 
fidelity to the original meaning—and to new originalism83—but can 
readily be deployed to defend the very results that modern originalism 
was created to criticize. 
Barnett’s and Balkin’s work tends to illustrate rather starkly the 
central thesis of this Article: that new new originalism is, at least in 
practice, not meaningfully different from non-originalism.84 Of course, 
 
 77. Steven D. Smith, Reply, Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 Const. 
Comment. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 196) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal); see also 
Balkin, supra note 49, at 295 (“Fidelity to the Constitution as law means fidelity to the words of the 
text, understood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the text.”). 
 78. Smith, supra note 77. 
 79. See Whittington, supra note 10, at xi (“I develop an explanation and defense of a theory of 
constitutional interpretation by the judiciary.”); Solum, supra note 41, at 2 (“This Article offers a 
theory of constitutional meaning that [] provides a theoretical foundation for original public meaning 
originalism.”). To be sure, Solum has used real cases to give context for the application of his theory, 
see, e.g., Solum, supra note 55, but his interest appears to be mostly theoretical. 
 80. See Barnett, supra note 55, at 118–21 (level of generality), 121–30 (construction), 355 
(libertarianism). 
 81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 82. Balkin, supra note 49, at 311–52. 
 83. Barnett appears to have coined the term “new originalism,” Barnett, supra note 68, at 620–22; 
Colby, supra note 30, at 1 n.2, and clearly identifies as a new originalist, see Randy E. Barnett, 
Underlying Principles, 24 Const. Comment. 405, 405–09 (2007) (describing his embrace of this form of 
original-meaning originalism). Balkin has tended to eschew the term, but his focus on the original 
semantic meaning of the text, see Balkin, Framework Originalism, supra note 53, at 552, places him 
squarely in the new originalist tent. See Barnett, supra, at 410–11. 
 84. Balkin has been quite aware of this implication of his work. He has argued that the “choice 
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just as originalism is more a family of theories than one coherent and 
unified interpretive approach,85 non-originalism, as Justice Scalia and 
others have eagerly pointed out, is not easy to capture in a brief 
description.86 For present purposes, however, I use Mitchell Berman’s 
description of non-originalism as the “thesis that facts that occur after 
ratification or amendment can properly bear—constitutively, not just 
evidentially—on how courts should interpret the Constitution . . . .”87 
Notwithstanding the caricature of non-originalism that many originalists 
have offered,88 most non-originalists—or at least most scholars or judges 
who do not readily identify as originalists89—believe that the original 
meaning is highly relevant and often dispositive.90 Few, if any, non-
originalists would claim, for example, that a thirty-year-old person is 
eligible to be President,91 or that the Republican Form of Government 
 
between original meaning and living constitutionalism . . . is a false choice,” Balkin, supra note 49, at 
293, and that the project of living constitutionalism (a synonym for non-originalism) is essentially a 
project of construction and thus entirely consistent with a commitment to the original meaning. 
Balkin, supra note 53, at 559–60. Barnett similarly originally described his version of originalism as an 
“originalism for nonoriginalists.” Barnett, supra note 68; see also Solum, supra note 41, at 164–67 
(discussing the relationship between living constitutionalism and originalism). 
 85. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 244–45. 
 86. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 
101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 383, 391 n.36 (2007) (“[J]udges of various ideologies cannot be expected to reach 
agreement on any alternative method.”); Scalia, supra note 35, at 45 (“[Non-originalists] divide into as 
many camps as there are individual views of the good, the true, and the beautiful.”); Scalia, supra note 
24, at 855 (“[I]t is not very helpful to tell a judge to be a ‘non-originalist,’ [because non-originalism] 
represents agreement on nothing except what is the wrong approach.”). 
 87. Berman, supra note 49, at 24; see also Dennis J. Goldford, The American Constitution and 
the Debate over Originalism 139 (2005) (“The characteristic and controversial move of 
originalism . . . [is] that the original understanding of the constitutional text always trumps any 
contrary understanding of that text in succeeding generations.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Sourcebook, supra note 31, at 7 (“[A]ll [non-originalists] reject original meaning as 
relevant to constitutional interpretation . . . .”). 
 89. See Powell, supra note 29. 
 90. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 49, at 24–25 (“Not a single self-identifying non-originalist of whom 
I’m aware argues that original meaning has no bearing on proper judicial constitutional interpretation. To 
the contrary, even those scholars most closely identified with non-originalism . . . explicitly assign original 
meaning or intentions a significant role in the interpretive enterprise.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 487, 488 (1996) (“[M]ost 
views—my own included—assume that original understanding and purposes are relevant to 
constitutional interpretation. Differences emerge only over how, and how weightily, these 
considerations enter the interpretive matrix.”); Farber, supra note 37, at 1086 (“Almost no one 
believes that the original understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional 
interpretation.”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
877, 880–81 (1996) (noting that “[v]irtually everyone agrees” that text and original meaning matter in 
constitutional interpretation). 
 91. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“[N]either shall any person be eligible to that Office who 
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years . . . .”); see also Balkin, supra note 49, at 305 
(offering this example); Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 263 (same); Richard Kay, 
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 
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Clause92 could plausibly be read to guarantee the modern Republican 
Party a constitutional monopoly on power at the state level. In other 
words, most non-originalists treat the original meaning as the starting 
point for any interpretive inquiry, but are willing to look elsewhere—to 
history, precedent, structure, and policy, to name a few of Phillip 
Bobbitt’s famous modalities of constitutional argument93—to construct 
constitutional meaning when the text is vague or indeterminate. 
If this is a fair description of non-originalism, then if nothing else it 
should be clear that new new originalism is not very different from non-
originalism in practice.94 For both, the original meaning generally provides 
the starting point for any act of constitutional interpretation, but because 
of the level of generality at which much of the constitutional text is 
expressed, it rarely alone provides the conclusion.95 For both, the types of 
constitutional questions that are most likely to be litigated—those for 
which the relevant constitutional text is capacious and abstract—require 
tools of judicial decisionmaking beyond mere reference to the original 
 
82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 263 (1988) (same). 
 92. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 93. Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 7–8 (1982); see Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 
1189, 1189–90 (1987). 
 94. As noted above, Balkin has recognized this implication of his work. See supra note 84. Others 
have observed in passing that new new originalism tends to collapse the distinction between 
originalism and non-originalism. See James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 Md. L. 
Rev. 10, 10–11 (2007) (“[Balkin’s originalism] is for all intents and purposes equivalent to Dworkin’s 
moral reading [of the Constitution].”); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist 
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1343, 1371 (2009) (“An interpretive approach that can so readily 
produce such diametrically opposite results dissolves the distinction between originalism and living 
constitutionalism.”); Smith, supra note 77 (“[On the Balkin view,] [t]he difference between originalism 
and ‘living Constitutionalism’ has vanished . . . .”). Solum anticipated these developments years ago, 
during the early days of original-meaning originalism, when he argued that there is “no meaningful 
distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation.” Lawrence 
B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1599, 1603 (1989). Solum recognized 
that non-originalist theories still inevitably pay substantial attention to the original meaning, and that 
any plausible originalist theory, including one that seeks the original meaning at the level of “general 
principle,” id. at 1612, in practice, will be forced to use non-originalist tools to decide cases. Id. at 
1621–22; accord Solum, supra note 41, at 166–67 (discussing the “compatabilist account” of the 
relationship between living constitutionalism and originalism); cf. Fallon, supra note 90, at 488 (“[His 
version of non-originalism] stands as a stark alternative to some versions of originalism, but is rather 
close to several others that have claimed the designation.”). 
 95. See Farber, supra note 37, at 1087 (“[Originalists] who focus on the framers’ general 
principles . . . may be difficult to distinguish from non-originalists . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also 
Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 Const. Comment. 411, 432–33 
(1998) (“This move from specific intentions to general principles . . . eliminates any meaningful 
distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism because the Constitution’s broad phrases are 
defined at a level of generality that makes them useless in hard cases for anything other than symbolic 
purposes.”). 
Smith_62-HLJ-707 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2011 12:30 PM 
724 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:707 
 
meaning of the text.96 And for both, the abstractness of the constitutional 
text and the indeterminacy inherent in the process of construction mean 
that there can be no perfectly predictable template for constitutional 
decisionmaking and thus, that there is a range of plausible and defensible 
results.97 
This is not to say that new new originalism and non-originalism are 
identical. Some non-originalists, for example, reject the premise that 
judges necessarily owe fidelity to the original meaning, even when it is 
expressed at a very high level of specificity; these non-originalists seek 
constitutional meaning in, among other things, “the argumentative norms 
of a culture and of a practice”98 or in the evolving norms of society.99 
These forms of non-originalism remain meaningfully different from new 
new originalism, because (at least in theory) they deny that the original 
meaning even of straightforward constitutional text expressed at a high 
level of specificity—such as the minimum age requirement for eligibility 
for the presidency—necessarily constitutes constitutional meaning 
today.100 But these forms of non-originalism are hardly typical of persons 
who do not identify as originalists.101 
 
 96. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Balkin, supra note 67, at 483–85, 511 
(referring to Bobbitt’s modalities); Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and 
Construction, Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2008/04/legal-theory-
le.html (last modified May 16, 2010) (“[T]he interpretation-construction distinction opens the door for 
a partial reconciliation of originalism with living constitutionalism: the Constitution can live in the 
‘construction zone’ where the linguistic meaning of the Constitution underdetermines results.”). 
 97. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 98. Berman, supra note 49, at 66. 
 99. See Leib, supra note 45, at 359–60. It is also possible for a focus on the principles underlying 
the text to lead to conclusions that are inconsistent with the text itself, an approach that arguably is 
inconsistent with new new originalism as well. See Barnett, supra note 83, at 413–14. 
 100. See Leib, supra note 45, at 356–61 (arguing that even Balkin’s originalism is fundamentally 
different from living constitutionalism, because it places dispositive weight on history in some cases); 
cf. Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions 
79–116 (2007) (arguing that Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution is meaningfully 
different from all forms of originalism). 
 101. See Colby, supra note 30, at 46–47 (arguing that non-originalists generally invoke the 
Constitution’s underlying principles in order to “give the indeterminate text a meaning (or if you 
prefer, construction) that is suitable for modern circumstances”). It is perhaps more useful to conceive 
of approaches to constitutional interpretation as falling along a spectrum based on the weight 
accorded to the original meaning. Mitchell Berman, for example, has noted that non-originalism is 
“modest,” and generally “does not hold that original meaning, when discoverable, should be irrelevant 
to judicial interpretation, or even that its relevance should be slight.” Berman, supra note 49, at 24. 
Similarly, he notes that originalists vary in the strength of their claims about the role of original 
meaning in interpretation. See id. at 10–12. He concludes that what distinguishes Originalism (with a 
capital O) from non-originalism is the “thesis that original meaning either is the only proper target of 
judicial constitutional interpretation or that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate 
meanings that the text might bear,” and that “nothing that transpires after ratification of a particular 
constitutional provision, save a subsequent constitutional amendment, has operative (as opposed to 
evidential) bearing on what courts ought to identify as constitutional meaning.” Id. at 22. As Berman 
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II.  The New New Originalism and the Old New Originalism 
(and the New Old Originalism) 
My point, in any event, is not that new new originalism and non-
originalism are identical, but instead that the differences between the two 
approaches are modest in practice.102 Perhaps for this reason, not all 
originalists—indeed, not even all self-described “new originalists”—have 
embraced new new originalism’s refinements to originalist theory. 
Indeed, modern originalism arose as a response to the perceived excesses 
of non-originalism, and its proponents have long promoted it as a 
distinctive alternative to the interpretive approaches that justified 
Griswold, Roe, and similar decisions.103 It must be disconcerting, to say 
the least, for many originalists to have a parade of scholars embrace new 
new originalism and then apply it to justify the results in those cases. It 
thus is not surprising that many originalists have resisted refinements to 
their theory that would tend to collapse the distinction between 
originalism and non-originalism. 
As noted above, some of these originalists agree with the new new 
originalists, in theory, that we should sometimes seek the original 
meaning at a high level of generality—that is, when the reasonable 
reader at the time of ratification would objectively have understood the 
text to express broad principles rather than narrow, rule-like 
injunctions—but nevertheless conclude that the Constitution, in fact, 
contains limited and determinate provisions that accordingly do not 
confer broad discretion on judges.104 Steven Calabresi and Livia Fine, for 
example, agree that judges should be faithful to the objective original 
meaning of the text105 and thus, that judges should enforce constitutional 
provisions that embody general, open-ended standards, even though 
“different reasonable constitutional interpreters will differ on how the 
standard should be applied.”106 But Calabresi and Fine also contend that 
 
acknowledges, however, one can be a “strong” originalist and still conclude that some constitutional 
provisions were “originally understood at a level of generality too high to permit effective resolution 
of disputes.” Id. at 30. It is with these originalists that I am concerned here. And to the extent that 
some of those originalists believe that there is a nontrivial number of constitutional provisions whose 
original meaning was objectively expressed at a high level of generality, their approach to 
interpretation tends to shrink the gap between originalism and non-originalism that Berman so 
astutely describes. 
 102. See Fallon, supra note 90, at 491 (“In its moderate versions, originalism appears to differ from 
its competitors mostly as a matter of degree . . . .”). 
 103. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study 73 
(1992) (“[T]he historical record is clear that the framers often employed abstract language to express 
quite concrete or specific conceptions or rules.”). 
 105. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 68, at 669 (“What judges must be faithful to is the enacted law, 
not the expectations of the parties who wrote the law.”). 
 106. Id. at 672–73. 
Smith_62-HLJ-707 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2011 12:30 PM 
726 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:707 
 
“the Constitution contains fewer open-ended, evolutionary clauses” than 
most new new originalists think.107 Indeed, they conclude, somewhat 
startlingly, that the objective original meaning of the Due Process, 
Privileges or Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment can readily be identified at a high level of 
specificity, and thus those provisions are not, in fact, susceptible to a 
broad range of meanings.108 Others have made such claims about other 
ostensibly open-ended provisions, such as the Ninth Amendment109 and 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.110 Given such 
conclusions, these originalists usually have had little to say about the 
propriety of judicial construction of the Constitution. But even if they do 
not object to the notion of constitutional construction in theory, they 
presumably see little need for it in practice, given their insistence that not 
many provisions of the Constitution are, properly understood, open-
ended statements of principle phrased at a very high level of generality. 
Other originalists categorically reject the claim that the original 
meaning of some constitutional provisions—even those phrased in vague 
or abstract terms—should be ascertained at a high level of generality. 
These originalists have argued that judges instead should always seek the 
original meaning at a high level of specificity. They have sometimes 
reasoned that the original meaning, even when understood at a high level 
of generality, is generally sufficient to resolve constitutional questions 
 
 107. Id. at 698. 
 108. Id. at 692–98. Gregory Bassham has made a similar claim about the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. In his view, although the language “may be abstract,” its original meaning “was as 
fixed and definite as the common law could make a phrase.” Bassham, supra note 104, at 73–74 
(quoting Charles P. Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in Edmund N. Cahn, Supreme Court and 
Supreme Law 170, 177 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. See Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2046–48 (rejecting the view that the Ninth Amendment might 
protect particular unenumerated rights, and arguing that the “proper” textualist meaning of the 
Amendment is that the specification of rights in the Constitution did not “work a pro tanto repeal of 
state law rights possessed against state governments”). In addition, Justice Scalia has suggested that 
the Equal Protection Clause speaks with the requisite specificity to overcome the objection that 
Brown was wrong because segregation was accepted at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, he argued that “when a practice not expressly 
prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, 
widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper 
basis for striking it down.” 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He then responded to Justice 
Stevens’s charge that such an approach would have mandated the conclusion that segregation does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause by arguing that Brown v. Board of Education does not demonstrate 
“the dangerous consequences of this principle,” because tradition has a role “in giving content only to 
ambiguous constitutional text.” Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95, n.1 (citing 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). In his view, the 
Equal Protection Clause and “the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of black 
slavery [left] no room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race”—and in 
particular laws segregating on the basis of race—“are invalid.” Id. 
 110. See Bassham, supra note 104, at 74 (arguing that the Free Speech Clause contains a “clear and 
reasonably determinate standard”). 
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that arise today.111 More frequently, these originalists have reasoned that 
judges ought to read even ostensibly vague provisions at a narrow level 
of abstraction, because unconstrained construction, which becomes 
necessary when original meaning is discerned at a high level of 
generality, is inconsistent with the judicial role or with democratic values. 
For example, Bork—who was once an old originalist and then seamlessly 
became a new originalist112—famously analogized the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to an “ink blot,” 
because its “meaning cannot be ascertained” and argued that “[n]o judge 
is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the ground that there must be 
something under it.”113 Michael Stokes Paulsen, who considers himself a 
new originalist,114 has developed this claim, arguing that “[w]ith certain 
texts thought to be highly general or vague, the answer might simply be 
that the text in fact does not supply a rule or a standard.”115 Paulsen has 
acknowledged that “textual imprecision or generality often admits of a 
range of choices,”116 but he has contended that “if the meaning of the 
Constitution’s language fails to provide [a determinate] rule or 
standard—if it is actually indeterminate (or under-determinate) as to the 
specific question at hand—then a court has no basis for displacing” 
 
 111. See Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2056 (“[The rules of originalism] do not answer all questions, 
but they answer a lot of them.”); Scalia, supra note 35, at 45 (“Often—indeed, I dare say usually—[the 
original meaning of the text] is easy to discern and simple to apply.”). Justice Scalia has tempered this 
claim by acknowledging that “[s]ometimes (though not very often) there will be disagreement 
regarding the original meaning; and sometimes there will be disagreement as to how that original 
meaning applies to new and unforeseen phenomena.” Scalia, supra note 35, at 45; see also Scalia, supra 
note 24, at 856 (“[Originalism’s] greatest defect . . . is the difficulty of applying it correctly. . . . [I]t is 
often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text.”). But Justice Scalia 
and others expect these instances to be “exceedingly rare.” Sourcebook, supra note 31, at 28. As 
Justice Scalia has stated, the “originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many of them.” 
Scalia, supra note 35, at 46; see also Kay, supra note 91, at 258 (“The good faith application of original 
intentions will resolve many cases in ways which are relatively free from doubt.”). 
 112. Although Bork began as an old originalist, see Bork, supra note 22, at 826 (urging fidelity to 
the original intentions), he eventually appears to have embraced many of the tenets of the new 
originalism, a shift that he described as simply a clarification of his earlier work, see Bork, supra note 
28, at 144. He rejected the quest for original intent and instead urged a focus on the objective original 
understanding, id., and he argued that an originalist should seek the original meaning at “the level of 
generality that interpretation of the words, structure, and history of the Constitution fairly supports.” 
Id. at 150; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding his arguments about the 
level of generality, however, Bork apparently concluded that certain provisions of the Constitution 
were so abstract (and thus obscure) that judges should simply decline to enforce them.  
 113. Bork, supra note 28, at 166. 
 114. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1127, 1134–48 (defending “original public meaning 
textualism” and describing its place in the evolution of originalism); id. at 1139 (using the term “new 
originalism” to describe “original meaning textualism”). 
 115. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Construction?, 
103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857, 881 (2009). 
 116. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 991, 
995 (2008). 
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political decisions.117 On this view, textual “indeterminacy implies 
broader political, democratic discretion, not broader judicial discretion.”118 
It naturally follows, as Paulsen explains, that the “power of constitutional 
construction within the boundaries of a general text is for Congress, not 
the courts.”119 
Not surprisingly, originalists who have resisted the move to 
objective-original-meaning originalism have also rejected the new new 
originalists’ claims that abstractly phrased constitutional provisions 
should be interpreted at a high level of generality, and that judges can 
properly engage in construction to give concrete meaning to such 
provisions in application. Richard Kay, for example, has lamented that 
new originalism—and particularly new new originalism120—is likely to 
“generate more cases of constitutional indeterminacy than will the 
originalism of original intentions,”121 because there is no objective, a 
priori way to determine the appropriate level of generality at which a 
hypothetical fictional person would understand the text’s objective 
meaning.122 Because such indeterminacy inevitably will lead to 
 
 117. Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2057; accord Paulsen, supra note 115, at 881 (“[T]he Constitution’s 
text itself suggests, as a practical matter, a default rule of interpretation where the constitutional text is 
unspecific: popular republican self-government.”); see also Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional 
Interpretation, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 631, 633 (1993) (“The absence of a clear constitutional basis for 
invalidation of a political choice should mean that the choice is not invalid . . . .”); Michael W. 
McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 359, 361 (1987) (“If the 
judge . . . concludes that he cannot tell whether a challenged governmental action is forbidden by the 
Constitution, then he is free to leave the determination of the legal rule to the elected authorities.”). 
 118. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 Const. 
Comment. 289, 296 n.18 (2005); accord Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1129–30 n.54 (“[W]here 
there is a range of equally legitimate interpretations, and the political branches have chosen one of 
them, there is no basis for the courts to invalidate the political branches’ choice.”); Paulsen, supra note 
116, at 995 (“[T]he more indeterminate or under-determinate the range of a constitutional provision, 
the broader the duty of the courts to defer to what the legislature has enacted.”); Paulsen, supra note 
115, at 882 (“Unspecific texts do not warrant abstracting more specific principles. The Constitution’s 
structure suggests the opposite rule: Unspecific texts, to the extent of their un-specificity, permit a 
range of legitimate interpretation and application by political decisionmakers.”). Paulsen bases this 
“rule against abstraction” on the fact that the Constitution is written and specifically identifies “this 
Constitution” as supreme law. Paulsen, supra note 115, at 881–82. Nelson Lund similarly has 
recognized that the constitutional text often does not resolve concrete questions, and that in such 
cases, there is no “algorithm” for deciding the question. Lund, supra note 94, at 1372. Unlike Paulsen 
and Bork, however, Lund argues that “a conscientiously originalist court has no choice but to decide 
the issue in light of the purpose of the provision as that purpose was understood by those who adopted 
it.” Id. Lund has nevertheless criticized Balkin’s new new originalism, because a “moderately clever 
and determined practitioner of such ‘originalism’ should be able to get just about any result that a 
living constitutionalist might desire.” Id. at 1371. 
 119. Paulsen, supra note 116, at 995. 
 120. Kay, supra note 40, at 723–24 (discussing Balkin’s work). 
 121. Id. at 721. 
 122. See id. at 725 (“[R]elying on an artificial concept instead of on an actual historical event 
inevitably enlarges the field of such imaginative reconstructions.”). 
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unconstrained judicial decisionmaking, Kay rejects the propriety of 
interpreting constitutional text at a high level of generality, and he 
concludes that unguided judicial construction is inconsistent with any 
proper account of originalism.123 Steven Smith, who has urged a return to 
“that old-time originalism,”124 has similarly argued that “understanding 
constitutional provisions as embodiments of principles”125—that is, 
interpreting vague constitutional text at a high level of generality—
enables the very sort of instrumentalism that originalism originally was 
devised to resist.126 And John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, who 
have advanced a more eclectic version of originalism,127 have rejected the 
new new originalists’ embrace of construction, arguing that the 
construction is inconsistent with the original interpretive rules embraced 
by the Framers128 and is likely to produce “inconsistent and ad hoc 
results.”129 
To all of these originalists, there is still a significant (and 
fundamental) difference between originalism and non-originalism. Their 
versions of originalism, either in practice or by design, do not entail 
judges’ drawing on extra-constitutional sources in the course of 
exercising broad discretion to assign meaning to vague constitutional 
 
 123. Id. at 721 (“The discovery of indeterminacies in otherwise originalist interpretation has been 
the ‘little gap’ through which a broad range of judicial choice has been perceived.”); id. at 721 n.76 
(“The absence of determinate meaning has been explicitly linked to the practice of ‘constitutional 
construction’ whereby interpreters are obliged to extend the binding force of the Constitution beyond 
its linguistic meaning.”). 
 124. Smith, supra note 40, at 1. 
 125. Smith, supra note 77. 
 126. See id. at 189 (“[Jack Balkin] has advocated . . . an approach which, by interpreting the 
Constitution’s original meaning to embrace a set of open-ended principles, is able to justify pretty 
much any results that the most ardently progressive constitutional heart could desire.”). Smith instead 
suggests an approach that would limit constitutional meaning to “what the human beings who enacted 
the provision thought it meant,” id. at 198, which is quite similar (even if not necessarily identical) to 
the original-expected-applications approach that most new originalists have rejected. See supra note 
77. 
 127. McGinnis and Rappaport have promoted “original methods originalism,” an approach that 
requires the interpreter to use “the interpretive methods that the constitutional enactors would have 
deemed applicable to it.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 51, at 751. This approach mediates 
between original-intent originalism and original-meaning originalism, see id. at 752, 758–65, and rests 
for its normative justification in large part on the fact that the Constitution is the product of a “strict 
supermajoritarian process.” Id. at 755; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 86, at 384–91. 
 128. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 51, at 773 (“[A]dvocates of construction have not 
provided evidence that anyone embraced construction at the time of the Constitution’s enactment, and 
we have been able to find none. To the contrary, the evidence that we have found suggests that 
interpreters believed that ambiguity and vagueness could be resolved through the applicable 
interpretive rules, and thus through originalist methods.”). 
 129. Id. at 784; see also id. at 783 (“Because there is no legally required or even accepted method 
for determining how to resolve questions of construction, judges are likely to determine how to engage 
in construction based on their own views.”). 
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text. In deciding how different originalism and non-originalism are, in 
other words, it depends a good deal on which originalists we ask. 
III.  Where Does Originalism Go from Here? 
In one respect, there is nothing new in this state of affairs. As Tom 
Colby and I have shown elsewhere, originalism has long been more a 
collection of loosely related interpretive theories than one coherent 
approach to interpretation.130 Originalists have long disagreed about the 
proper object of the interpretive inquiry,131 about the relevant evidence 
for assigning constitutional meaning,132 and about the role of precedent in 
constitutional decisionmaking,133 to name just a few areas of debate. Even 
questions about levels of generality and the propriety of judicial 
construction of broadly phrased text are not new.134 New new originalism, 
in this sense, is perhaps no more different from new originalism (or old 
originalism) than was any other theory that claimed the label originalism 
over the years. 
But in another respect, the schism that new new originalism is 
provoking in the originalist camp is quite different from the intramural 
disagreements of the past and, consequently, is profoundly important for 
originalism’s continuing viability. Originalism was originally offered—
and continues to be offered today by many of its adherents—as a neutral 
and objective antidote to what many viewed as the unprincipled 
instrumentalism of other approaches to constitutional decisionmaking. In 
collapsing much of the distinction between originalism and non-
originalism, however, the new new originalists have threatened to 
explode what has long been at the core of originalism’s appeal. 
Much of the force of the case for originalism has traditionally 
derived from its claims to neutrality and objectivity, characteristics that 
its proponents contend are lacking in non-originalist alternatives. In one 
of the earliest defenses of modern originalism, for example, Bork 
 
 130. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 258. 
 131. See id. at 248–55. 
 132. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1145–48. 
 133. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 260–62. 
 134. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 6–8 
(1986) (“I would caution against judicial choices of levels of generality. Ascending the ladder of 
generality obliterates those limits [on judicial power].”); id. at 10–11 (“Frequently there will be cases 
where general language is not illuminated by legislative history, where the evidence of original 
intention is ambiguous, looks both ways, or is altogether lacking. There the judge must, as Justice 
Holmes observed, legislate ‘interstitially,’ or as Cardozo put it, fill ‘the open spaces in the law.’” 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917); Benjamin N. Cardozo, 
The Nature of the Judicial Process 113 (1921)); see also Berger, supra note 21, at 99–116 (criticizing 
the “‘open-ended’ phraseology theory” of interpretation); Kay, supra note 91, at 264 (discussing the 
relationship between the level of generality of the constitutional text and original intentions). 
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maintained that if we are to insist that judges be controlled by “neutral 
principles,” then we must insist that they be faithful to “the text and the 
history, and their fair implications.”135 McConnell similarly has argued 
that originalism “supplies an objective basis for judgment that does not 
merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance,” whereas 
“constitutional interpretation based on the judge’s own assessment of 
worthy purposes and propitious consequences lacks that objectivity.”136 It 
is “this potential for neutrality that accounts for the visceral appeal of 
originalism.”137 
Originalists’ frequent claim that their approach is uniquely effective 
at constraining judges flows directly from this premise regarding 
neutrality and objectivity.138 At bottom, originalists have advanced their 
claims about neutrality and objectivity, and their claim about constraint, 
to underscore that originalism is uniquely legitimate—and thus 
fundamentally different—from non-originalism.139 Of course, these claims 
have long been met with skepticism.140 When Berger contended in the 
 
 135. Bork, supra note 21, at 2, 8; see also Maltz, supra note 15, at 789 (“[U]nlike nonoriginalist 
theories, at its core originalism does not depend on extralegal, nonneutral justifications. Instead, it is 
premised on internal legal conventions developed without regard to some specific political agenda 
unrelated to the nature of judging itself.”); cf. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of 
Originalism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 283, 286 (1996) (“Integrity characterizes a judicial process 
based on originalism, [whereas] its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its alternatives.”). 
 136. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2415 (2006) [hereinafter McConnell, Active Liberty] (reviewing 
Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (2005)); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 Yale 
L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) [hereinafter McConnell, Role of Democratic Politics] (reviewing Michael J. 
Perry, Morality, Politics and Law (1988)) (“The appeal of originalism is that the moral principles so 
applied will be the foundational principles of the American Republic . . . and not the political-moral 
principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”); see also Tara Smith, Why Originalism 
Won’t Die—Common Mistakes in Competing Theories of Judicial Interpretation, 2 Duke J. Const. L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 159, 161 (2007) (“The deeper reason that Originalism will not die, I think, is that it has 
staked out the moral high ground, championing the objectivity of interpretation that is essential to the 
ideal of the rule of law.”). 
 137. Maltz, supra note 15, at 794. 
 138. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 21, at 6 (“[A] legitimate Court must be controlled by principles 
exterior to the will of the Justices.”); Scalia, supra note 24, at 863–64 (arguing that originalism limits 
the likelihood that “judges will mistake their own predilections for the law,” because it relies on 
historical facts outside of any judge’s particular preferences, whereas non-originalism “plays precisely 
to this weakness”); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 104, 106 (1989) (“A central 
concern of originalism is that judges be constrained by the law rather than be left free to act according 
to their own lights, a course that originalists regard as essentially lawless.”). 
 139. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 135, at 286 (“Integrity characterizes a judicial process based on 
originalism, and its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its alternatives.”); Scalia, supra note 24, at 
854 (“The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism . . . is its incompatibility with the very 
principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.”); McConnell, Active Liberty, supra note 
136, at 2387–88 (arguing that originalists “offer a principled justification for the pattern of decisions 
they favor,” but that non-originalists “have yet to propound a comparable theory”). 
 140. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
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1970s that originalism would prevent judges from imposing their values 
under the “guise of interpretation,”141 critics responded by noting that 
originalism itself was not neutral or apolitical.142 After Edwin Meese 
launched the Reagan administration’s campaign in favor of originalism in 
the 1980s, stressing that the approach was “not a jurisprudence of 
political results” but instead, was an effort “to depoliticize the law,”143 
critics responded by noting that textual and historical ambiguities 
inevitably would lead judges to make political and normative choices.144 
And the “campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of Original 
Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning”145 initially did little to 
answer those criticisms.146 
But the embrace by most originalists of the idea of objective original 
meaning and the growing recognition, on the part of many prominent 
originalists, that the original meaning sometimes must be ascertained at a 
broad level of generality, produced increasing acceptance of originalism 
in the academy. As Tom Colby has explained, the scholars at the 
vanguard of the new originalist movement have helped to earn 
originalism, which was once regularly derided in the academy,147 “a 
respectable place in the pantheon of constitutional theory.”148 Of course, 
it is hyperbole to suggest, as has Barnett, that originalism, as traditionally 
understood, “is now the prevailing approach to constitutional 
interpretation.”149 But originalism, at least, has increasingly earned 
grudging respect as a viable, even if not wholly convincing, theory of 
constitutional interpretation. 
 
Constitution 10–11 (1996) (explaining that historical ambiguities complicate any effort to establish 
one fixed constitutional meaning); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: 
The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349, 397 (1989) (same). 
 141. Berger, supra note 134, at 1. 
 142. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469, 498 (1981) 
(“[J]udges cannot discover [the original] intention without building or adopting one conception of 
constitutional intention rather than another, without, that is, making the decisions of political morality 
they were meant to avoid.”). 
 143. Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 22, 29 (1985). 
 144. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 93, at 1213 (“[P]articular interpretations of the framers’ group 
intent . . . embody implicit or explicit normative judgments.”). 
 145. Scalia, supra note 31, at 106. 
 146. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 90, at 492 (“[Originalism is] perhaps most often a political or 
rhetorical stalking horse for a set of substantive positions with respect to a relatively narrow set of 
constitutional issues in the current age.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 561 (2006) (“As a political practice 
that developed in the 1980s, originalism seeks, more or less blatantly, to alter the Constitution so as to 
infuse it with conservative political principles.”). 
 147. Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 301, 301 (1996) 
(“[A]mong constitutional law scholars at elite schools, the idea of being an originalist is tantamount to 
being some sort of intellectual Luddite.”); Maltz, supra note 15, at 773. 
 148. Colby, supra note 30, at 34. 
 149. Barnett, supra note 68, at 613. 
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Colby has convincingly argued that originalism’s increasing 
intellectual respectability has come at the cost of its longstanding (if 
suspect) claims to judicial constraint.150 But the costs have been even 
greater than that. As noted above, the versions of originalism that have 
become increasingly popular in the academy tend to collapse the 
distinction between originalism and non-originalism.151 This has forced 
other originalists to reject—selectively or categorically—the very 
refinements that have made originalism a more respectable, coherent, 
and logically consistent approach. Because many of the new new 
originalists have built on the theoretical refinements of other originalists, 
while defending sometimes substantively liberal results, the originalists 
who have criticized or rejected their work have jeopardized, once again, 
originalism’s longstanding claims to political neutrality.152 
 
 150. Colby’s account, which is devastating, relies in large part on the theoretical refinements 
described above. But although Colby acknowledges that “[o]n the ground . . . it is getting harder and 
harder to tell originalism and nonoriginalism apart,” he resists the claim that these refinements have 
collapsed the distinction between originalism and non-originalism, stressing that “[i]n theory . . . the 
New Originalism still differs from its nonoriginalist rivals in important ways in terms of its 
understanding of constitutional meaning, constitutional legitimacy, and the proper role of the judiciary 
in our constitutional system.” Colby, supra note 30, at 41. This is surely correct, if one excludes new 
new originalism from “New Originalism.” But Colby treats essentially all of the developments in 
originalist theory since the days of Berger—including the claims by new originalists such as Lawson 
and Paulsen and the more capacious claims by Barnett, Balkin, and Solum about levels of generality 
and construction—as the accepted wisdom of new originalism. See id. at 6–7 (acknowledging that 
“only a few [originalists] have explicitly embraced all of” the “significant theoretical moves” that 
marked the evolution from the old to the new originalism, but focusing on the “collective[]” effects of 
these theoretical moves); id. at 67 (noting that not all originalists have endorsed “the full New 
Originalist theoretical package”). He is not necessarily wrong to do so; it is, after all, becoming almost 
impossible to keep track of all the variations in originalist thought, and in any event, there is “no 
official gatekeeper” to apply a test for originalist (or new originalist) purity. See Colby & Smith, supra 
note 6, at 258. But as I have explained, new originalism itself is becoming a deeply contested concept, 
and many (and perhaps most) new originalists have distanced themselves from the broader 
implications of the new new originalists’ claims. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 
657, 672 (2009) (“I am not convinced that an originalist ‘school’ can be identified that has all of [the] 
characteristics [of the new originalism] . . . .”). 
 151. See supra notes 89–101 and accompanying text. 
 152. There is some debate over whether the new new originalists are intentionally trying to be 
subversive, hoisting new originalists on their own petard and forcing them to acknowledge the logical 
consequences of their theory. See Barnett, supra note 83, at 414, 416 (predicting that some originalists 
will charge that Balkin is trying to preserve “an unvarnished living constitutionalism” while claiming 
the “mantle of originalism” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Colby, supra note 30, at 40 (“One 
might be tempted to speculate that what is really going on here is not that originalism has 
fundamentally changed, but rather that several former nonoriginalists have jumped on the originalism 
bandwagon, and have attempted to co-opt the ‘originalist’ label for their owned decidedly 
nonoriginalist purposes.”); Smith, supra note 77, at 194–95 (questioning whether Balkin’s conversion 
to originalism is “sincere or . . . strategic”). It is true that some of the new new originalists did not 
identify as originalists until recently. See J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of 
History, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 915 (1988) (“I do not agree with Berger’s theory of constitutional 
interpretation . . . .”); Barnett, supra note 83, at 405 (“All the time I was doing my earliest writings on 
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Originalism, in other words, has come full circle. It arose in response 
to non-originalism and its perceived vices. It claimed the virtue of 
neutrality, but was criticized as unavoidably political and theoretically 
unsound. It changed, gradually working towards theoretical legitimacy. 
Those changes made it more attractive to scholars from across the 
ideological spectrum, which, in turn, helped to substantiate its claims of 
neutrality. But in doing so, it started to look like non-originalism, the 
approach that it was created to criticize. And to many of its long-time 
proponents, this was too high a cost. But in rejecting new new 
originalism—even though its claims follow naturally from the central 
tenets of new originalism—originalists risk ceding, once again, any 
genuine claim to neutrality. 
Originalism is thus at a crossroads. Steven Smith has summed up the 
dilemma that he and other originalists face: Originalists “must of 
necessity view constitutional provisions as expressing principles, or at 
least general categories of some sort, if the provisions are to have any 
current and useable meaning at all,” but such an approach “opens up 
originalism to precisely the sort of open-ended, licentious 
interpretations . . . that Balkin offers.”153 Originalists can join the new 
new originalists in acknowledging that originalism is a limited theory of 
interpretation that alone cannot answer many questions of constitutional 
law, and thus accept that the project of constitutional interpretation 
sometimes requires judicial creativity to implement the Constitution’s 
abstract principles. Or they can continue to claim that originalism is 
capable of answering all constitutional questions without any need for 
broad judicial discretion—or at least that the Constitution, properly 
understood, does not in fact confer any substantial judicial discretion. 
Thus far, most self-described originalists (both new and old) seem to 
have decided that the costs of the former are simply too much to bear. 
After all, if they acknowledge originalism’s limits, they risk collapsing the 
distinction between their approach and the alternatives. 
But there are also substantial costs in continuing to claim that 
originalism can provide answers to most constitutional questions without 
vesting judges with broad discretion. When originalists claim neutrality 
but apply originalism to vague text to produce almost exclusively results 
that are popular among political conservatives, they risk inviting the 
charge that their approach is in fact a political philosophy, not an 
 
the Ninth Amendment and the Second Amendment, I considered myself a nonoriginalist.”). But 
precisely because the versions of originalism that they offer are modest and not significantly different 
than most versions of non-originalism, there is perhaps little reason to doubt the sincerity of their 
commitments. 
 153. Smith, supra note 77, at 195, 196. 
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interpretive methodology.154 One can be forgiven for questioning 
originalism’s neutrality, for example, when originalists contend that the 
Constitution’s ostensibly broad, rights-granting provisions in fact carry 
narrow, determinate meanings—and thus, that conservative bugaboos 
such as Lawrence v. Texas155 and Roe v. Wade156 are clearly wrong157—but 
that much of the modern administrative state (which is unpopular among 
political conservatives) is unconstitutional because of an unenumerated 
nondelegation principle.158 Similar doubts arise when originalists assert 
that judges should simply decline to enforce underdeterminate rights-
granting provisions in order to increase the space for democratic 
decisionmaking159—a respectable even if contestable view—but that the 
capaciously phrased Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment clearly 
prohibits Congress’s authority to limit the influence of money in 
elections.160 If the “true” originalism—that is, anything but new new 
originalism—somehow almost always produces conservative results from 
indeterminate text, then originalism’s claim to political neutrality 
becomes significantly more difficult to sustain. 
Conclusion 
If originalism is as much a political philosophy as an interpretive 
methodology, then it will by definition continue to be quite different 
from non-originalism. Modern originalism was conceived, in the words of 
Edwin Meese, one of its most prominent early political patrons, as a 
 
 154. Several commentators have argued that originalism is more a political movement than an 
interpretive methodology. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 90, at 492; Greene, supra note 150, at 702; Post 
& Siegel, supra note 146, at 561. 
 155. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 157. See Calabresi & Fine, supra note 68, at 692–98; Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process 
After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1517, 1531–41 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An 
Originalist Reappraisal, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1097, 1107–15 (2004); cf. Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2047–48 
(arguing that the Ninth Amendment is a narrow provision that makes clear that the enumeration of 
rights running against the federal government does not “work a pro tanto repeal of state law rights 
possessed against state governments”). 
 158. See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled 
Executive, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1696, 1704 n.45 (2009); see also Lawson, supra note 72, at 395 (arguing 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause “textually embodies a nondelegation principle”). 
 159. See Paulsen, supra note 116, at 995; supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925–29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing 
the original meaning of the First Amendment); see also Paulsen, supra note 116, at 993 & n.9 
(describing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), as an “atrocit[y]”). To be fair, Paulsen has been 
unusually willing to follow his approach to open-ended provisions, even when it leads to results that 
are generally anathema to political conservatives. See id. at 991–95 (arguing that the faithful application 
of his version of original public meaning textualism requires the conclusion that “the powers conferred 
on the national government are huge, sweeping, overlapping, and, when taken together, very nearly 
comprehensive”). 
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project to curtail “the radical egalitarianism and expansive civil 
libertarianism of the Warren Court.”161 Its self-conception has long been 
developed largely in contrast to those perceived (liberal) excesses of non-
originalism.162 The response of most originalists to the new new originalists 
suggests that, to them, originalism’s core identity continues to depend on 
its rejection of interpretive approaches that vest judges with discretion to 
inject substantively liberal values into the Constitution—and thus, 
depends on the maintenance of a sharp demarcation between originalism 
and non-originalism. It is for this reason that new new originalism’s 
challenge has been particularly subversive. In rejecting new new 
originalism, originalists might preserve the distinction between 
originalism and non-originalism. But they may do so at the expense of 
their claims to political neutrality and objectivity. 
 
 
 161. Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 
27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 464 (1986). 
 162. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 35, at 38–39 (discussing the “Great Divide” in constitutional 
interpretation between originalists and non-originalists). 
